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INTRODUCTION

It is no secret analytical and continental philosophies regard
one another's enterp_rises with mild indifference, fueled occasionally by
bouts of fierce contempt.
what "they" do is not.

Each believes what it does is philosophy, and

How do two so radically different philosophical

schools overcome their professional disdain for each other without compromising their own positions?
While there are many different reasons for this situation, one
assumption encouraging it which the philosophical tradition reinforces
must be rejected.

Both camps embrace a presupposition of methodological

economy, that some single philosophical method, theory, or position must
account for experience more successfully than those methods, theories,
or positions which account for it by means of depending upon one another.

This application of Ockham's razor at the level of method hind-

ers theories from uniting forces for attempting a more successful management of experience.
As theoretical reflection upon concrete experience, philosophical theories can manage experience more successfully than they previously have by seeing how several different positions and methods complement
one another than by trying to dismiss and undermine one another.

In

view of the theorizing revolutions of early twentieth century science,
the assumption of what Karl-Otto Apel calls methodological solipsism 1

iv

blocks philosophical theories from adequately accounting for concrete
experience.

The first chapter argues this presupposition is not a nec-

essary condition for successfully dealing with experience.
chapter proposes philosophical

positions,

The second

analogously to Bohr's

and

Heisenberg's complementarity thesis of the relationship between classical and quantum theories of physics, be recognized as attempts to meet
the shortcomings of the tradition in order to bring it to completion.
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CHAPTER I

CONFRONTING METHODOLOGICAL SOLIPSISM

Distinctions

are

Introduced

into

Experience.

Analytical

and

continental philosophers balk at the suggestion that more similarities
than differences exist between their methods.

Phenomenology, by means

of intuitions, and analytic philosophy, by means of concepts, share an
affinity with respect to how each operates in the process of inquiry.
In both camps, reason has an unrelenting need to secure what it deems to
be clear and distinct knowledge.
Loosely speaking, a concept is a general representation enabling
knowers to organize their world, mediating the differences between subjects, objects, and one another.

Kant's pure principles of the under-

standing, the categories, means for the experience of nature, are concepts.

Intuitions, on the other hand, are what is known immediately,

without representation, by someone of something nonpropositional, i. e.
unrepresentable experiences, such as knowledge of oneself, the external
world, universals, and values.
Martin Heidegger illustrates the difference between concepts and
intuitions with the "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandsein,
"present-at-hand" (Vorhandsein, concepts).

intuitions)

and the

But his illustration defines

both concepts and intuitions only by reference to the activity (or the

1

2

lack of activity) of subjects. 2 Not all experience is initiated by a
knower.

No conscious activity produces intuitions in experience.

produces them is phenomenal activity.
ized by consciousness:

What

Mathematical intuitions are real-

their certainty springs from feelings of obvi-

ousness phenomena produce in consciousness.

Attention to things does

not produce them, William James writes; they "come to us by their own
laws.

[T]he feeling of attending need no more fix and retain the

ideas than it need bring them." 3
For example, the distinction between between interpretation and
explanation comes out of experiencing resistance, having attraction as
is its necessary condition.

Attraction denotes a relationship between

"things" either naturally or involuntarily drawn toward each other.
While physics takes this relation to be natural, other world-views regard the same relation as involuntary.

It is as if one needs to distin-

guish an "attraction " from an "attraction ," the pull (positively) re1
2
ferring

to

nature

vs.

the

pull

(negatively)

referring

to

will.

Experiences of resistance in dealing with life convincingly shows those
experiences do not open up the world; it is because the world can and
does open up that such experiences are

possible.~

tions like nature/will, subject/object,

This implies distinc-

and so forth,

are introduced

into experience for the sake of arranging and controlling it.

What

fuels the fires of philosophical exploration and interpretation is interest, involvement, engagement, concern.
Philosophy reflects on experience in order to handle life as
clearly and as completely as possible.

The history of philosophy has

3

assumed all possible experience can and should be managed by some single
philosophical theory or position.

The following two sections are an

overview of the methods of reflection presupposed by theoretical distinctions introduced into experience, viz., thinking vs. feeling.
Thinking:

Acting upon Experience.

Conceptuality is categori-

al, and categorial thinking separates some things from other things, arranging reality according to some determinations held to be more significant than others.
changed over time,

Ideas about

how categorial thinking works have

because ideas about what categorial thinking acts

upon, namely experience, have shifted from those of stability to those
of fluctuation.

In Kant's time, it was supposed nature fit into sepa-

rate, neat, clear-cut categories, like a pigeonhole.
ture not fitting were, in principle, impossible.

Instances of na-

Today concepts hang

woven together like a fishing net, catching from experience whatever
does not slip through its weave.

Experiences of novelty, spontaneity,

and possibility support the image of nature's dynamis.
Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein initially sought a neutral conceptual framework in which all other operational frameworks could be
grounded.

Heidegger's aim in Being and Time was to discover and make

explicit a fundamental ontology, a doctrine of categories to act as a
foundation supporting each and every theory of existents.

The Tractatus

Wittgenstein had believed standards of meaning were merely the logical
forms of the language to be understood.

Later on, however, he explicit-

ly rejects this. 5 In its place he posited a plurality of rules of possible language-games,

guided by the situational context and "forms of

4

[human] life."

Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's turn to language were at-

tempts to move from the conceptual to the preconceptual or intuitive
level of knowledge.
Language is used with an indefinite, unlimited number of terms
(both actual and possible), and each of any number of terms may perform
several different functions.

Both Wittgenstein and Heidegger believed

examining the context of a term and its use shows the various roles it
plays within language. 6 Linguistic analysis is divided between continental and Anglo-American philosophy with respect to the intuition/concept
distinction, with the emphases falling on language's content vs.
logical form.

its

Whether one begins with particular words and aims for

general conclusions about language or with language and seeks the content of words, one learns linguistic investigation, instead of providing
a neutral framework for pseudo-objective examination, only forces the
investigator to recognize language itself as a part of the subject matter under investigation.
Stephen Erickson rightly notes "the notion of an entity existing
independently of human agency and awareness" is highly suspect.

7

Being

and language are two theoretical determinations drawn out from a distinction-free "primeval pool," which James names pure experiences.

The

diversity of interests bearing upon this hypothetical construct yields
ordinary,

everyday,

makes

"lived"

experience

more

(immediate)
than

it

experiences.
[interest]

"The
is

made

interest
by

it

[experience]."' Nothing appears to get outside of interests once and for
all; even "purely" theoretical constructs (like James's "pure experienc-

5

es") still serve a purpose.

Interests perform in contexts of purpose,

at work before any separation between subject and object, between freedom and nature, between science and art, between thinking and feeling.
Successful philosophical strategies have the ability to apply different
determinations for managing different situations in experience.
Feeling:

Reacting to Experience.

Where analytic critiques of

knowledge concentrate on the construction of concepts,

phenomenology

takes up the intuition side of the coin of experience, in order to guard
against unnecessary reductions of experience.
Heidegger's notion
James's

notion

of

"pure

source of distinctions.

of logos is

more or less

.
"
experiences,

the

identical with

theoretically primordial

Now Heidegger's approach toward this distinc-

tion-free construct comes from the side of feeling.

His strategy is to

refrain from acting, to resist the urge to draw distinctions out of it,
to allow the distinctions to make themselves felt.

Pure experiences

(i.e., purely theoretical experience) can never become ordinary experience without persons to experience them.

9

Feeling indicates the direc-

tion of acti:vity between the object/subject poles.

Where thinking is

the activity of consciousness upon phenomena, feeling is the activity of
phenomena upon consciousness.
expression:

Heidegger conveys this with his "Being"

where traditional metaphysics (synonymous with categorial

thinking) tried to represent this, overcoming metaphysics is a matter of
overcoming the urge to represent, to express the "idea" of Being in such
a way without mediating the difference between it and beings.

10

6

Heidegger uses this background with his discussion of moods.

11

Critiques of knowledge have been unaware of the intuitive side of inquiry,

always

leaving

the

questioning

under

the

inquirer's

thumb.

Moods, though, are beyond conscious control, something one finds oneself
in, not in oneself.

The philosophical tradition relied too often on its

ability to cut its object of study to pieces.

Most recently, and espe-

cially in Continental philosophy, the discipline has overreacted by creating the opposite reliance of unbounded invention, neither giving nor
subjecting itself to show some warrant of its authority.

12

In careless hands, phenomenology's strength easily becomes its
most dangerous enemy.

Herbert Spiegelberg recognizes this danger as he

defends the epistemological rights of hermeneutics by maintaining it "is
a matter not of mere constructive inference but . . . at most [one] of
an intuitive verification of anticipations about the less accessible
layers of the phenomena." 13 Hermeneutics appears to border on mysticism;
it commits philosophical fraud if it foregoes verifying felt intuitions
only to celebrate sublime feelings.

It is necessary and important for

philosophy to recognize the value of feelings, but it is not sufficient.
Experience Management

Failures.

The

desire to

control all

possible realms of experience by means of a single theory has blocked an
adequate way of dealing with life.

If thinking dominates the attempt to

manage experience, the gains of formal clarity are negated by the losses
of content and completeness.

Conversely, if feeling overrides thinking

in directing life, choas results, without definition or delimitation.
Both of these moves are unsatisfactory.

Left to their own methodologi-

7

cal values, unaware of one another, neither feeling nor thinking alone
successfully manages experience.
Scientism.

Intellect, emotion, and will can be theoretically

discriminated from one another.

Any attempt at isolating them from each

other in concrete investigation ought to be highly suspect.

Science's

ability to effectively manage its subject matter has greatly tempted
philosophy to adopt and adapt a scientific attitude toward its objects
of inquiry.

Carried to the extreme of scientism, philosophy tacitly ac-

cepts certain determinations,

namely,

those most directly linked to

mathematical frameworks, as more valid and valuable to their concerns
while simultaneously suppressing other determinations and aspects of the
situation.

Suspicion should force a re-examination of the motivation

for wanting to keep some aspects of the human questioner suppressed
while allowing others to dominate the approach.
By using a mathematical framework as the ultimately legitimate
referential context, nature appears in pure objectivity.

Stepping back

from this context, and viewing the framework within a wider context of
life, one realizes its objective "truths" are functions of science's
specific interests in knowledge.

From this different viewpoint,

the

outer relations marked by science are not so much experience as they are
the results of experience subjected to an elimination process.

14

James

argues this is the modus operandi of mathematical sciences such as mechanics, physics, and chemistry.

In spite of nature's contradictory and

defiant appearances, science comes up with the principle of its uniformity.

Outside of science's narrow context, a belief about the truth of

this principle is one of convenience, not necessity.

8

By adding imagination to explanation for the sake of a coherent
order of information, one no longer deals with a simple, clean, and direct opposition between subject and object, questioner and questioned.
An objectivistic bent in examination allows the illusion of a single ob-

ject of investigation:

what is covers over its possibilities.

to interpretation inverts this;

The move

possibilities are constantly breaking

through attempts to decisively conclude the study.

An interpreter needs

help to avoid scientistic interpretation.
Historicism.

The opposite extreme of scientism is historicism,

the view that the values of anything can be accounted for through the
discovery of its origins and an account of its development.

Like scien-

tism, it fails to adequately manage experience, though it fails for different reasons.

The determinations historicism values

(temporality,

change, differences and contingencies) tend to overshadow and suppress
others (timelessness, stability, similarities and necessities).
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty characterizes the
scientism and historicism of the philosophical tradition with his distinction between "systematic" and "edifying" philosophers.

15

In his ef-

forts to show philosophizing that values only determinations of thought,
Rorty makes the same kind of mistake, albeit in a different way.

He

tries to do to the philosophy of the history of philosophy what Kuhn did
to the philosophy of science.

16

Unfortunately, an historicistic under-

standing of experience, in and of itself, is no better than a scientistic one:

both insist upon a select group of determinations at the ex-

pense

others,

of

and by

doing

so,

each

manages

only

a

part

of

9

experience.

With respect to experience as a whole (a totality of all

possible experience), each theory is inadequate.
Instead of claiming the values of both science and history are
needed, Rorty argues philosophy ought to give up one set of determinations for another:

"cultural anthropology (in a large sense which in-

cludes intellectual history) is all we need." 1 7 But it is not all we
need.

If one has cancer, do they seek a cultural anthropologist?

Can

the intellectual historian get a person from Chicago to Los Angeles in
four hours?

Needs are the results of a process acting upon wants.

Var-

ious wants compete with one another, and those seeking first satisfaction are named needs.

Once they are satisfied, however, other wants be-

come "new" needs to be satisfied.
view to the eternal.

Humans are temporal beings with a

They want and need both science and history, be-

cause both are ways of organizing experience.

More importantly, having

both science and history reminds one there is more than one way of dealing with experience.

Unaware of

this,

believing present management

strategies are the only or best way of dealing with it, makes one less
likely to invent new management strategies if old ones break down.
This first part has tried to show people reflect upon experience
in order to manage it as clearly and as completely as possible.
Western philosophical tradition has only

The

recently recognized it has

presupposed all possible experience can be controlled by some single,
all-encompassing super-theory.
discovered.

No such position has been invented or

Philosophy's two predominant means of reflection, thinking

and feeling, when working independently and exclusively of one another,

10

have been only marginally effective in dealing with experience.

Left to

their own devices, each method ends in failure.
The next chapter proposes to show how thinking and feeling, each
with their own particular strengths in guiding experience, can offset
and overcome each's particular shortcomings and limitations.

The prec-

edent for such a proposal is Werner Heisenberg's account of how science
uses two totally incompatible theories of physics, viz. the classical
Newtonian theory vs. modern science's quantum theory of physics, to understand and explain nature.

Ultimately, what governs the revolution in

modern scientific theorizing, purposes, can direct a reformulation among
contemporary philosophical reflection.

CHAPTER II

PROPOSING METHODOLOGICAL COMPLEMENTARITY

The

pertinent methodological

thinking and feeling,

task

is

not to decide

to appeal to one over the other.

Distinctions

like subject/object and intellect/will satisfy theoretical,
interests.

between

aesthetic

Returning reflection to concrete experience seeks to meet

practical, ethical concerns.

Yet as returning reflection, the opposi-

tions invented at the theoretical level in order to gain a foothold in
experience are transformed into kinships at the practical level in order
to act upon and change experience.

In this way the strengths peculiar

to the opposing means reinforce one another by complementing each other
in their common contest to gain mastery over life.
Heisenberg's "Lesson of Quantum Physics."

Part of the problem

of getting linguistic analysts and phenomenologists to discuss their
strengths and weaknesses lies in both camps' ignorance of contemporary
science's program of methodology.

18

A variety of ways of looking at

things can be employed in accordance with a variety of interests.

By

exploring various interests, one avoids both dogmatism and relativism.
Modern science has significantly revised both man's understanding of the universe as well as how to explain that understanding.

With

classical Newtonian concepts, physicists believed experimental findings

11

12
were fundamentally dependent upon and explained by an unalterable theory
of nature.

This belief eventually gave way with the theorizing revi-

sions needed from the confrontation of classical concepts with modern
scientific theoretic breakthroughs, such as Bohr's conceptual model of
the atom and Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty.
Together Bohr and Heisenberg developed what they have called the
concept of complementarity.

Primarily, it underlines how, in the meas-

urement process, the scientist interacts with the object; the object is
not revealed as it is in itself but as limited to and affected by the
nature of measurement.

Technological advances gave access to realms of

experience unavailable to "ordinary" experience.

Bohr and Heisenberg's

complementarity concept aimed to illustrate how two totally incompatible
theories, such as the classical one based upon ordinary intuitions of
space vs. the quantum theory based upon previously unobservable observations.

The impact of their concept upon modern science was to encourage

scientists "to apply alternatively different classical concepts which
would lead to contradictions if used simultaneously." 19 Heisenberg felt
active observation reveals an "impure" datum, affected by both theory
and situational context.
This attitude toward theorizing highlights Heidegger's claim of
thinking bringing something before us, 20 i.e., thinking is representational.

Representation generalizes from particulars,

those determinations they have in common.

selecting only

For example,

the concept

"leaf" has to be general enough to be able to account for the different
sizes and shapes among its various kinds.

Heisenberg's indeterminacy

13
as a matter of degree instead of

principle supports
one of kind.

The indeterminacy principle makes it possible for science

to account for reality in terms of its factuality and also its possibil~.

While the phenomena of atomic events are as real as any other

more ordinary appearances, the entities postulated of them (atoms, electrans, quarks) are less real because they are meant to refer to "a world
of potentialities . . . rather than one of things." 21
Heisenberg's complementarity thesis is philosophically significant because it claims the relation between observed and observer works
in two directions.

Experience is the result of consciousness organizing

appearances and of appearances acting upon consciousness.

The inability

to see the whole picture is due to both mind and world, as each attempts
to secure the other once and for all.

Given this, the old image of na-

ture as passively yielding to scientific inquiry has been replaced by
one of nature revealing itself as it, as well as the observer, chooses.
Where thinking gives consciousness a degree of control over things,
feeling gives things some control over their presence to consciousness.
In thinking,

consciousness pursues phenomena.

In feeling,

phenomena

pursue consciousness.
Wittgenstein suggests it is unreasonable to insist upon an idea
of completeness of language.

Language has evolved, retaining what sur-

vives through time while adding to itself new discoveries (e.g. chemistry or calculus). 22 Heisenberg also opposed the postulate of complete
logical transparency of concepts.

By attempting to extend the investi-

gation of nature to its most remote parts, he argues, one cannot really

14

know ahead of time how to qualify their use of particular concepts.

In

some instances concepts will be used in unwarranted and meaningless
ways. 23 Accumulation over time has made both language and meaning grow
ever more subtle and complex.

The progress of theoretical constructs

depends upon seeing old problems in new ways, upon taking experience not
as a collection of "brute facts" but as having a focus of reality enframed by the background of its possibilities.
The notion of complementarity, along with Heisenberg's principle
of indeterminacy, emphasizes the irreducible connection between an investigation's process and its conclusions.
it is without the other.

Neither of these can be what

Fields of experience opened up by technologic-

al advances are clearly known once they are enclosed within theoretically constructed limits and distinctions.
a matter of rationality.

These limits are not completely

Though one can give reasons for choosing some

determinations instead of others, the reasons themselves do not make the
choices.

Decisions contain an element of irrationality necessary to the

task of rational deliberation. 24 Reality is a combination of the relations an enquirer thinks into as well as feels from experience.
Consciousness structures experience in conjunction with phenomena.

Some ten years before Heisenberg was born, James proposed "reality"

to be a function of two conscious determinants.

That we can at any moment think of the same thing which at any former moment we thought of is the ultimate law of our intellectual
constitution.
But when we now think of it incompatibly with our
other ways of thinking it, then we must choose which way to stand
by, for we cannot continue to think in two contradictory ways at
once. The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole psycholo-

15
gy_ of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental
~--first,

that we are liable to think differently of the same;
and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of
thinking to adhere to and which to disregard. 25

Reality is a matter of thinking and choosing; they mutually affect one
another.

Deliberation and decision belong to consciousness together.
Complementarity and Contemporary Philosophy.

The distinction

between thinking and feeling, like other distinctions, serves its purpose by separating experience into two parts, in this instance, distinguishing two modes of consciousness.

Consciousness is

part of experience, as opposed to the phenomenal.

itself only a

Heidegger, by con-

trasting the ready-to-hand with the present-at-hand, outlines a distinction of two "elements" yet shows those two elements are still fundamentally

connected. 26

As

connections,

phenomena/consciousness distinction.

bridge

the

Thinking and feeling differ with

respect to both sides of this distinction.
are ascribed only to consciousness.

relations

Usually thinking and feeling

Instead, thinking is the activity

of consciousness dealing with phenomena, and feeling is the passivity of
consciousness as

it is dealt with by phenomena.

When consciousness

thinks, phenomena feel, and when phenomena think, consciousness feels.
It sounds animistic to describe thinking and feeling as activities of
both phenomena and consciousness, but it reminds one that thinking and
feeling are not exclusively conscious activities.
As universal deception is impossible because the meaning of deception depends upon the meaning of truth, so also all possible investi-

16
gations must begin from something rather than nothing.

As a term,

"nothing" only makes sense by means of its relation to the term "something."

Take away something, and there is nothing; take away "some-

thing," i.e., the logico-grammatical structure presupposed by the term,
and communicative activity is no longer possible.

Erickson points out

how the philosophical tradition, especially German idealism, has argued
how something is something and avoids being nothing by virtue of having
at least one determinate characteristic, 2 7 a mark or evidence of some
source conditioning the possibility of beings.
Relations are not purely conceptual entities.

Concepts are con-

sciousness 's way of dominating phenomenal experience.
both thought

into and felt within experience.

Relations are

The prejudice of the

philosophical tradition to value thinking over feeling is not enough to
demonstrate feeling is not as significant as thinking.

And though the

opposite bias of feeling over thinking seems a plausible response, it is
only a different way of committing the same mistake.

Whether feeling or

thinking is more important is an irrelevant and ultimately self-defeating question for philosophical methodology.
The opposition between thinking and feeling serves a knowledgeinterest at the level of subject/object.
a self/others level.

Ways of living are reviewed at

The opposition between thinking and feeling is

subsumed at this level, because self-reflection requires the combination
of their strengths.

Jurgen Habermas claims "what unites the identity of

mind and nature with their non-identity can itself be conceived according to that type of synthesis through which the identity of an ego comes

17
into being. 1128 Being determinate is not Being's only kind of Being.

A

composite of creative imagination and critical discernment, of feeling
and thinking acting in concert in order to survive, ought to be the model for philosophical methodology.
Clear knowledge can be had only with "closed theories," theories
applied to already clearly delimited realms of experience.

Drawing lim-

its means some possibilities attract more attention than others.

Possi-

bilities keep realities alive, dynamic, and vigorous by attempting to
"overthrow" the reigning determinations.
ting possibilities secures experience.
experience becomes boring.

On the positive side, forgetIf forgotten too long, ordinary

Conflict and competition can be an advantage

for opposing philosophical theories.

Think of how much has been learned

by the two camps refutations of one another.

The complementarity of

theories need not suggest all conflict and strife will disappear.

Phil-

osophical examinations which realize social as well as metaphysical or
epistemological connections with the world know both analysis and intuitions occupy every turn of a spiraling process of investigation.
Instead of linking limitation solely with consciousness, it has
to be seen as effecting the whole of experience.

The categorizing and

schematizing the world reflected in the history of the tradition is evidence of consciousness's drive to dominate appearances.

While not all

of consciousness's attempts to control phenomena succeed, those failures
have been attributed to the weakness of consciousness rather than to the
strength of appearances.

This is a difficult habit to break.

Thanks to

the genius of people like Heisenberg, science has been able to recognize

18

experience's capacity to arrange and re-arrange itself.

It takes a cri-

sis of consciousness (for example, an infinite regress) for its reflection to move to a level over and above its "ordinary" referential contexts.

The infinite regress experience tempts consciousness to ground

its examination objectively at a "language-game" level. 29 Reflection can
operate on something other than itself, yet when the other denies it
satisfaction, it reflects upon itself, i.e., it performs self-reflectively.

Moving from the level of subject/object frameworks to a level

of the examination of frameworks, the self/others level, the move to a
transcendental-pragmatic level of intersubjective argumentation, makes
the conditions of critical discussion non-objectifiable.

The "object"

of the discussion is the structure proposed by consciousness.
Recognizing possibilities as possibilities is a primary task of
self-reflection.

Experience itself is the result of the complementarity

of thinking and feeling.

Consciousness explicitly conscious of appear-

ances is simultaneously implicitly conscious of itself.

By rising above

the subject/object difference, complementary theoretical frameworks turn
an essentially bipolar relation into a triadic one, consisting of three
"elements" with three identifiable connections between the elements.
Object, subject, and other subjects interact on two levels.

At one lev-

el are connections between original subject, the object, and other subjects.

The other level is the relationship between the original subject

and other subjects.

At the first level, what individuals believe to be

unbiased, interest-free accounts of their surroundings are brought to
bear upon one another at the second level in order to see how the presence of the interpreter influences the interpretation.
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Habermas supports Apel's two orders' distinction by claiming the
addition of interpretation to explanation changes the relation of observing subject and observed object to "that of a participant subject
and partner. " 30 Because interpretation depends upon a subject, anyone
using the subject/object distinction as the key support of their frame
of reference cannot reach a meaningful interpretation.

This structure

must be annexed by the further distinction of a self vs. others. 31 The
individual's interpretation

(who, it is assumed,

has some procedural

[though not necessarily "rational"] manner) is weighed in light of the
procedures others hold to be valuable in assessing the interpretation.
An individual interpretation's degree of meaningfulness and viability is

affirmed or rejected by those standing outside of it.
Psychoanalysis is Habermas 's example of how the opposition between thinking and feeling is placed within a more comprehensive context
in order to challenge connections which are "not anchored in the invariance of nature . . . [but] in the spontaneously generated invariances of
life history," connections altered or "dissolved by the power of reflection. 1132 The movement from the subject/object to the self/others level
Habermas explains as the coming into being of an ego-identity.

The

shift takes up the opposition of the first level and employs it within
the second.

Philosophical theorizing needs to recognize inquiry finds

significance in both space and time, and privileging either space (traditional empiricism, analytic philosophy) or time (traditional rationalism, phenomenology) over the other is a self-defeating project.

The

theoretical distinction between space and time must remain theoretical,
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for the same reason one wants to preserve the difference between actuality and possibility, or between foreground and background:

the content

of the terms lies in their relation to one another.
Habermas claims one can describe a psychologically "unhealthy"
individual to be experiencing a disturbance between life and language. 33
Though repressed, a neurotic can meet the requirements of communal understanding and conform with its social amenities in everyday living.
The price a person pays for this pleasant, charming facade are the feelings of a hollow, gutted interior lying beneath it.

The appearance of

undisturbed communication with others may only mask the individual's
disturbed self-communication.

While the "language without" flourishes,

the "language within" is abandoned, made inaccessible to the neurotic
the neurotic.

BI

In a parallel fashion, a good philosophical methodology,

by undertaking the activity of understanding, can help itself come to
grips with itself.

The myopia of an exclusively intuitive or exclusive-

ly conceptual philosophical approach is similar to the privatized portion of the excommunicated language of the neurotic:

according to only

a single framework, each pretends to the appearance of being the definitive expression of an appropriate method.

In confrontation with other

systems, "unhealthy" philosophical methods deny considering other appearing conditions.
On the Possibility of Meaning.

Truth-as-correspondence presup-

poses and depends upon an awareness of meaning.

This awareness, Erick-

son holds, "is the means by which there first comes to be a cognitive
world of experience--something given in a cognitive sense. 1134 W'ittgen-
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stein identifies

the correspondence theory of truth as

the highest

achievement of rationality, yet holds language is an achievement over
The difference between people and animals

and beyond " or d'1nary " reason.

with respect to language, Wittgenstein says, is not simply a lack of the
mental capacity needed for talking.
Or to put it better:

He says, "they simply do not talk.

they do not use language. " 35 By this Wittgenstein

means human beings "see" purposes to be met and look for ways to meet
those purposes.

Truth-as-correspondence presupposes meaning; it is a

function of the framework in which it operates.
for the possibility of meaning.

Conditions also exist

While it is a framework of truth, mean-

ing can also be a focus within a wider context, outlined against a background of purposes, a teleological backdrop.

Whereas the needs of ani-

mals

potencies

are

met

through

instincts,

inherent

beyond

animal

control, human "instincts'' can be controlled by will and reason.

Ani-

mals do not "see" or realize anything like needs to be met as needs-tobe-met because their innate capacities take on concerns without having
to "think" about them.

Humans, on the other hand, deal with their envi-

ronment by reason's light.

The light which makes a solution to a prob-

lem possible is also responsible for the possibility of seeing a problem
in the first place.
The "commerce" between language and being is meaning.

Physical

signs grasped by psychical beings make meaning possible; reflecting upon
the experience of knowledge makes knowledge of that experience possible.
Wittgenstein's arrow points not solely on account of the "dead line on
paper" (the physical sign)

nor solely on account of some "psychical
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"
.
t h 1ng.

He writes "the arrow points only in the application that a liv-

ing being makes of it. " 31 Wittgenstein locates meaning in the use of
some thing by some person.

His inversion of these biases makes respon-

sible and energetic procedures possible.

Instead of identifying under-

standing as a mental process, he suggests considering processes (mental
and otherwise) as aspects of understanding. 37 Understanding, like interests and purposes, precede the separations organizing experience.
Heidegger reflects Wittgenstein's inversion of understanding as
he discusses meaning.

Meaning is not identical with intelligibility,

but entails intelligibility; 31 the intelligible has meaning, but not
everything meaningful is intelligible.

According to Habermas, intelli-

gibility is a knowledge-constitutive interest, a context guiding other
interests.

In order to shift intelligibility from framework to focal

point, a more general background is needed.

Meaning provides a back-

ground within which the intelligible is explainable and interpretable.
Apel's critique of ideology tries to reflect meaning's capacity
as a context for understanding through a reconstruction of "meaningful"
experiences.

The intersubjective community considers concrete episodes

it regards as influential in its life and, knowing it cannot transport
itself to a time prior to any separation, allows its collective experience to act as the parameters of what it means by meaning.

39

Setting a

limit allows the critique to preserve and achieve a definite measure of
responsibility, while dealing in experiences renews an ideology in vitality and strength.
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Functions re-introduce a context of teleology above ordinary
everyday "ways of living."
isfies life's demands.

Each life-form is tested to see how it sat-

The operating purposiveness is like Kant's de-

piction of living as if the worlds of nature and freedom were one.

The

teleological background highlights the connection, the interaction, the
conflict between freedom and nature.

As facts are read into experience,

meanings are appropriated from it;

as

facts are to interpretations,

meanings are to purposes.
Unfortunately,

function or purpose is

taken too narrowly by

some, causing them to believe what is advocated is instrumentalism, and
efforts to clear functions of this charge lead to subsequent charges of
relativism.

Now a desirable theoretical position lies between these

two -isms, and agrees with concrete experience.

Instrumentalism is too

narrow a conception of function because one can imagine situations of an
other than problem-solving kind, for instance, going out to a movie,
where it makes more sense to speak of how the activity "satisfies" one
than of how one "uses" it.

If someone insists they used the movie, e.g.

as an escape or diversion, the person fails to recognize any substantive
difference between wants

and needs.

Instrumentalism,

the notion an

idea's truth is a function of its utility, addresses what human forms of
life require, though not what those forms desire.

Both needs and de-

sires are kinds of wants, and it is difficult to determine when the necessity wants imply crosses over from natural inner necessity and regulation (needs) to willed outer "necessity" (desires).

Objectors attack

instrumentalism by supposing a theory of meaning must ultimately bias
nature over and above will.
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This objection is incorrect, for two reasons.

First, instrumen-

talism addresses the connections of elements; to suppose it favors either nature or will is merely wrong.

Second, though it considers the

relation between will and world, instrumentalism is an -ism for giving
its account according to a single variable, viz. need or use.

In con-

fronting experience, instrumentalism holds one either meets a need or
fails to meet a need.
ures.

Survival depends upon more successes than fail-

Consequently, anything like desires is completely neglected by

heavy-handed instrumentalism.
Satisfying desires, on the other hand, need not be as successful, because the possibility of their satisfaction is enough to keep desires alive.

Finding connections between nature and will do achieve

some concrete results, meeting the needs of managing life adequately.
More importantly, looking for connections in experience is an activity
for its own sake, as a way of exercising the desire to master more of
life than life deems necessary.

In this way, the process of inquiry in

and of itself determines the ultimate standards of meaningfulness.
struggle to manage life conditions what it means to manage it.

The

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to show that various positions throughout the philosophical tradition, especially as exemplified in contemporary philosophy by the rival

factions of analytical and continental

schools of thought, have attempted to achieve both transparency of form
and quality of content by means of some single theory or method.

This

drive for methodological economy has only created extreme positions that
fail to meet the double aim.

Two of these extremes are scientism, the

sacrifice of content to the demands of mathematical clarity, and historicism, which seeks the completeness of accounts without concern for the
compatibility of those accounts.
The opposition between science and history concretely manifested
itself in the revolutions of theorizing experienced by early twentieth
century scientists.

Bohr and Heisenberg accounted for the dichotomy be-

tween history and science by developing a concept of complementarity.
The pull between science and history has also been experienced
within contemporary philosophy.

If several purposes reveal that differ-

ent positions, in conjunction with one another, offer an acceptable, adequate way of guiding experience, why insist on one and only one theory?
Philosophical reflection looks for connections in experience.

In addi-

tion to the metaphysical and epistemological connections it has made and
felt, it needs now to look for social connections of experience as well.
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This realm of connections opens up another layer of meaning.

Nor can

these connections be reduced to any simple pattern of use of an object
by

8

subject.

Needs are the focal points of a background of desires,

and desires are responsible for the possibility of meaning.
Philosophies that dismiss one another weaken the already fragile
connection between life and reflection upon it.

For Socrates, at least,

life without this connection was not worth living.

NOTES

i See pp. 147-157 of Karl-Otto Apel's Towards~ Transformation of Philosophy (trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby; London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1980) for his discussion of methodological solipsism.

2 Also, Heidegger's contrast between Zuhandsein and Vorhandsein implies
intuitions are epistemologically prior to concepts.
J "Attention creates no idea; an idea must already be there before we
can attend to it. . .
[I]t is only to the effort to attend, not to
the mere attending, that we are seriously tempted to ascribe spontaneous
power." William James, The Principles of Psychology (ed. Frederick H.
Burkhardt et al.; three volumes; Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University
Press, 1981), I, p. 426.

• "The summation of such experiences [of resistance] does not introduce
the disclosure of the world for the first time, but presupposes it."
Martin Heidegger, Bei_!!& and Time (trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson; New York: Harper and Row, 1962), § 43b, pp. 253-54 [210].
1 Apel, p. 7.
See also Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
(cited
below),
§ 65, p. 31e.
-,-1

Stephen A. Erickson, Language and Being: An Analytic Phenomenology
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 8.

1

Ibid., p. 155.

' "Only those items which I notice shape my mind--without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos." James, I, pp. 380-81.
1

"By responding [to logos], man gives voice . . . to world as well as
to things and, thus, to Being and beings in their difference, which is
nonetheless equally a belonging together." Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Ontological Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language," in On Heidegger and
Language (ed. and trans. by Joseph J. Kockelmans; Evanston, IL: 1972;
pp. 195-234), p. 216.
th [ t h e expression I Being],
I
I [mean] . . . the presence of Being,
more precisely the presence of the two-fold, Being and beings." Martin
Heidegger, On the Way to Language (trans. Peter D. Hertz; New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 26-27.
10

111.7 •

w1

27

28
,!~··Although he may give them more credit than they deserve:

"[T]he pos·' !bilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a
:ay·compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods." Being
and Time,§ 29, P· 173 [134].

-For-example,

see the section titled "Phenomenology of Reproduction"
Alison
M.
Jaggar's
and William L. McBride's article, "'Reproduction'
1
Male Ideology," in Women's Studies International Forum, vol. 8, no. 3
[1985], pp. 185-196.
u

a:

13 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement:
A Historical Introduction (second edition; two volumes; the Hague: Nijhoff Martinus,
1971), II, p. 695.

u For example, "our conviction of [the principle of uniformity's] truth
is far more like a religious faith than like assent to a demonstration."
James, II, p. 1233.
11 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 369-370.
11 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962).

17

"[T]here is no point in trying to find a general synoptic way of 'analyzing' the 'functions knowledge has in universal contexts of practical
life. 10 Rorty, pp. 380-381.
11

Apel, pp. 147-48.

11

Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern
Science (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 179. Nor does Heisenberg
restrict this concept to the realm of science: "we meet it when we reflect about a decision and the motives for our decision or when we have
the choice between enjoying music and analyzing its structure." Ibid.
2

D Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (trans. Ralph Manheim; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 118-19.

21

Heisenberg, p. 186.

22

"[A) s k yourself whether our language is
. complete;--whether it
. was so

before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal
calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of
our language."
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
(trans. G. E. M. Anscombe; third edition; New York: Macmillan; Oxford:
Blackwell, 1953), § 18, p. Se.
23

Heisenberg, pp. 85-86.

21o

"Th

.
e decision
may be the result of deliberation, but .

. at the

29
same time

. it excludes deliberation."

21

James, II, p. 920.

21

Being and Time, § 44b, p. 267 [224].

27

Erickson, p. 31.

Ibid., p. 205.

21 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro; Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 44.
29

Apel, p. 264.

au Habermas, pp. 180-81.
31 This is evidenced in Heisenberg's remarks about how the human attitude toward nature has changed from one of contemplation to one of pragmatics. See Heisenberg, pp. 196-197.
32

Habermas, p. 271.

33

Ibid., pp. 227-28.

Erickson, p. 113.
[ 151 ff.].

u

He also cites Being and Time, § 32, p.

35

Wittgenstein, § 25, p. 12e.

3&

Ibid., § 454, p. 132e.

37

Ibid., § 154, p. 61e.

31

Being and Time, § 32, pp. 192-93 [ 151] .

39

Apel, pp. 167-68.

192 ff.
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